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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

21 February 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SE-23: PROSPECTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
EFFECTIVE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND ORGANIZATION

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the major difficulties obstructing the formation
of an effective MEC and to estimate the probable future developments
in connection therewith.

SCOPE

The paper will fall into three broad categories designed to:
(a) summarize briefly the development of the MEC concept; (b) analyze
the major difficulties obstructing the formation of an effective
MEC; and (c) in the light of the discussion in (a) and (b),
estimate probable future developments connected with the MEC.
In the latter section consideration will be given to the problems
raised by efforts to concert US and UK policies in the area and
to the probable effects of allocating token US forces to the MEC.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEC CONCEPT.

A. What is the MEC concept?

1. What were the main provisions of the 4-power communication to Egypt of 13 October 1951?
2. What were the main provisions of the 10 November statement of principles sent to the other Arab states and Israel?

B. Who are the sponsors of the MEC concept?

1. What are their objectives?
2. To what extent do their views on the MEC differ?

C. What has been the reaction to the MEC in the area?

1. Egypt?
2. The other Arab states?
3. Israel?

II. WHAT MAJOR DIFFICULTIES ARE OBSTRUCTING THE FORMATION OF AN EFFECTIVE MEC ORGANIZATION?

A. To what extent does anti-British feeling in the area obstruct the formation of the MEC?

1. To what extent are the following aspects of the UK's position in the Middle East responsible for anti-British feeling in the area;

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- a. British treaty rights, occupation policies, arms assistance policies?
- b. British economic and financial relations with the ME states?
- c. Political influence exerted through British individuals in key positions?
- d. Territorial disputes?
- e. Historical and psychological factors?
2. Which of these factors are of particular importance in obstructing MEC developments? In what countries?
3. What specific developments in UK-Arab relations would significantly improve prospects of the MEC?
- B. What is the effect of Arab-Israeli tension on MEC Developments?
 1. What are the fundamental causes of this tension?
 2. To what extent do the following situations contribute directly to Arab-Israeli tension at present:
 - a. Border incidents?
 - b. Arab refugees?
 - c. Jewish immigration?
 3. How does this tension affect MEC developments? How important are the following considerations:
 - a. The Arab convictions that the US is supporting Israel at the Arabs' expense?

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- b. The Arab fear that the MEC is a Western attempt to force the Arabs to modify their attitude toward Israel?
- c. The Israeli fear that Arab military forces will be built up?
- 4. What are the prospects for a reduction (or increase) of Arab-Israeli tensions?
 - a. As a result of developments in the area?
 - b. As a result of present or contemplated US courses of action?
- C. What other major difficulties are obstructing MEC developments?
 - 1. To what extent does neutralism inhibit MEC developments?
 - a. To what extent is this neutralism the result of anti-Western feeling? Might it be expected to remain strong even if relations between the Western powers and the Middle East countries improved significantly?
 - b. To what extent is this neutralism caused by the conviction in the Middle East that the West is incapable of defending the area against Soviet aggression?
 - 2. To what extent do internal rivalries in the area obstruct MEC developments?

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3. To what extent do the Arab countries fear that the MEC is designed to re-establish Western spheres of influence in the ME?
 - a. What is the attitude of the Middle Eastern countries toward French participation in the MEC?
 - b. Turkish participation?

III. IN VIEW OF THE FACTORS IN I AND II WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS OF THE MEC DURING 1952?

- A. What is the likelihood of a solution of the UK-Egyptian issue that would be consistent with the MEC principles?
 1. What aspects of the MEC concept are likely to be resisted by the Egyptians in the negotiations?
 2. What would be the effect on the negotiations of a US offer to station forces in Egypt (or anywhere else in the ME?)
 3. What problems might be raised by efforts to concert US and UK policies?
 - a. In what respects might US and UK policies differ?
 - b. What would be the effect on Western security interests of such differences?

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B. In the event of a solution of the UK-Egyptian controversy:

1. What would be the attitude of the other Arab states toward the MEC?
2. How would Israel react?
3. In general, how could the MEC organization be expected to develop?
4. What further difficulties could be expected?

C. In the event of a failure of the UK and Egypt to reach a settlement of the defense and Sudan issues:

1. What would be the attitude of the other Arab states toward the MEC?
2. How would Israel react?
3. In general, how could the MEC organization be expected to develop?
4. What further difficulties could be expected?

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